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Abstract
In the proto-coalition model of government formation, formateur F appoints
a proto-coalition and asks its members whether to start negotiating a coalition
contract. If all accept, then the proto-coalition forms and starts negotiating;
otherwise a caretaker government assumes office. I extend this model by al-
lowing F to revise the chosen proto-coalition after rejections, that he states pre-
conditions for the subsequent negotiations, and that F’s opponents may publicly
pre-commit to accept/reject certain proposals. The set of equilibrium outcomes
is identified as the core if F’s opponents can pre-commit and as the convex hull
of the core if they cannot pre-commit credibly. This extended model elimi-
nates two flaws of the standard model: it explains why F cannot always install
his favored coalition (whatever the status quo) and why “important” coalition
members may have more bargaining power in the subsequent negotiations than
others.
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1 Introduction
The process of government formation is central in multiparty democracies. It deter-
mines the composition of the government coalition, which in turn sets the political
agenda and essentially passes the legislation. As a result, the institutional details of
elections and government formation affect income tax rates (Austen-Smith, 2000),
economic policy (Persson, 2002), fiscal policy (Persson and Tabellini, 2004), and
many related aspects. To analyze the institutional details accurately, increasingly re-
fined models of government formation have been developed in the literature (see for
example Diermeier, 2006, for a survey). The model that seems to capture the em-
pirical regularities best is the model of “proto-coalition bargaining” introduced by
Diermeier and Merlo (2000) and Baron and Diermeier (2001): The government for-
mateur F chooses a proto-coalition c, and if all members of c accept, then a coalition
contract is negotiated (using the model of Merlo and Wilson, 1995, 1998).1 Other-
wise, a default (caretaker) government assumes office.
This model is sufficiently flexible to account for the occurrence of minority,
minimal-majority, and surplus governments (by varying the default payoffs), and if
extended to account for out-of equilibrium phenomena, its parameters can be esti-
mated based on real-world data. The estimated structural models, in turn, have been
used in counterfactual policy experiments to study institutional and constitutional de-
sign (Diermeier et al., 2002, 2003, 2007). In this paper, I analyze an extension to the
model of proto-coalition bargaining that will be shown to account for two additional
phenomena that the standard model fails to explain in equilibrium: (i) F cannot al-
ways install his preferred coalition (even if the default payoffs are low) and (ii) coali-
tion members that are “important” (to be specified) have more bargaining power in
the subsequent negotiations than other parties. Thus, the range of outcomes compat-
ible with the proto-coalition model is widened substantially, and hence the extended
model allows more precise analyses of institutional and constitutional design.
1The main alternative models of coalitional bargaining, random proposer bargaining (Baron and
Ferejohn, 1989; Eraslan, 2002; Kalandrakis, 2006) and demand commitment bargaining (Winter, 1994;
Cardona-Coll and Mancera, 2000) apply less well to government formation (as opposed to parliamen-
tary bargaining, for example), as the identity of the formateur is not constant in these models.
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The main extension that I propose is as follows. If one of the parties in the
proto-coalition chosen by F refuses to start negotiating a coalition contract, then the
standard model posits that a caretaker government is instated. In most cases, the gov-
ernment formateur F may actually make a second proposal, or a third one if necessary,
and more generally modern means of communication render the existence of remote
time lines strategically irrelevant. Hence, government formation is more aptly mod-
eled as a game with infinite time horizon, at least as long as the time line is considered
“remote,” as opposed to a finitely repeated game or even a one-round game. Thus, ac-
tion and reaction between formateur and potential coalition partners are strategically
relevant already prior to the formation of the proto-coalition. An implication of this
interaction is that F’s opponents may reject the first proposal of F to force him into
forming the proto-coalition of their choice, rather than sticking with his choice. The
strategic relevance of the coalition preferences of F in relation to those of the other
players is empirically obvious (as different parties have different political platforms
and hence prefer to coalesce with different partners), but their relation is irrelevant in
the one-round model. In contrast, the standard one-round model explains deviations
from F’s favorite choice by assuming either high default payoffs or bounded ratio-
nality of F (as in logit choice functions, see Diermeier et al., 2003). Allowing F to
revise rejected proposals eliminates this neglect of the standard model.
Two other extensions to the standard model that I analyze are as follows. On the
one hand, I allow F to offer ideological or distributive concessions during coalition
formation (formalized as “pre-conditions” below), using which he may try to assem-
ble his favored coalition. On the other hand, I allow F’s opponents to pre-commit
publicly to accept or reject certain proposals of F . The results can be summarized as
follows. The extended proto-coalition game implements a “quasi-core” if F’s oppo-
nents may pre-commit publicly and it implements a superset of the quasi-core if they
cannot. These solution sets equate with the core and the convex hull of the core (re-
spectively) under the standard assumption that the status quo is bad. This relationship
between proto-coalition bargaining and the core is novel and will be established under
fairly general conditions. I then analyze several classes of example games to illustrate
the main characteristics of the extended model, and amongst others these examples
illustrate why F cannot always form his favored coalition (essentially, when it is not
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the favored coalition of the other players) and why F may have to give up bargaining
power during coalition formation.
The notation is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 analyzes the game where F’s
opponents cannot pre-commit credibly, Section 4 analyzes the game where they can.
Section 5 analyzes the example games and Section 6 concludes.
2 The base model
Definitions The formateur is denoted as F . The remaining players are denoted as
i ∈ N = {1, . . . ,n}. The game proceeds in rounds. In each round, F chooses a proto-
coalition c⊆NF :=N∪{F} such that F ∈ c and pre-conditions r∈R , where |R |<∞.
If at least one i ∈ c does not agree to negotiate under pre-conditions r, then a new
round begins. Otherwise, the proto-coalition forms and multilateral negotiations start.
The protocol of these negotiations is left open in the general analysis.2 Regardless
of the protocol, the expected payoffs from the negotiations are common knowledge
in equilibrium. They are denoted as vi(r,c) for all i ∈ NF and assumed to be non-
degenerate, see Eq. (1) below. Given the discreteness of the pre-conditions, non-
degeneracy is implied in most models of intra-coalitional bargaining. Examples are
discussed in Section 5. In turn, discreteness of R is required to express categorical
pre-conditions, e.g. whether new nuclear power plants may be constructed, whether
taxes may be raised, or whether one participates in international military campaigns.
A continuity assumption would be inappropriate in such cases, as pre-conditions prior
to government formation do generally not concern quantitative details such as size of
power plants or actual tax rates.
C(r)⊆ P (NF) denotes the set of proto-coalitions to which pre-conditions r may
be proposed; P (NF) is the power set of NF . In most applications, C(r) would sat-
isfy either uniformity (all pre-conditions are applicable to all decisive coalitions) or
2In this way, most reasonable models of the subsequent negotiations are treated in a unified manner,
e.g. random or deterministic proposer models, models of distributive and ideological decisions, and
different degrees of randomness of cake sizes. In such cases, the pre-conditions may concern relative
weights for proposal making, rights of first proposal, or restrictions of the bargaining outcome.
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specificity (every r ∈ R is applicable to exactly one coalition). The following analy-
sis treats these (and all other) cases in a unified manner. Without loss of generality,
assume that if C(r) is not a singleton, then the expected payoff vi is independent of
which proto-coalition c ∈C(r) accepts r. This comes without loss, since payoff rele-
vance can be expressed by refining R as necessary. Thus, vi(r)≡ vi(r,c) for all i∈NF
and all c ∈C(r), and non-degeneracy can be defined as
∀r,r′ ∈ R ∀i ∈ NF : vi(r) 6= vi(r′). (1)
Future payoffs are discounted by δ∈ (0,1), and the valuations of the status quo (which
applies until agreement is reached) are denoted as v˜i for all i∈NF . Note that the status
quo need not be “bad” in the sense of Banks and Duggan (2006). To summarize, the
game is defined as a tuple Γ= 〈N,R ,C,(vi),(v˜i)〉.
In addition, I use r1 %i r2 as a short-cut for vi(r1)≥ vi(r2), including all obvious
variations (e.g. r1 i r2), and the partial ordering “c” is used as follows.
∀r1,r2 ∈ R : r1 c r2 ⇔ ∀i ∈ c : r1 i r2. (2)
Strategies The set of t-round histories is Ht =
(
PF ×{0,1}N
)t , with t ≥ 0 and
PF := {(r,c) | r ∈ R and c ∈C(r)} (3)
as the set of proposals that F can make. The set of all histories is H = ∪t≥0Ht .
F’s strategy is a function τF : H → PF , and for all i ∈ N, strategies are denoted as
τi : H×Pi→{0,1}, with
Pi := {(r,c) | r ∈ R and i ∈ c ∈C(r)} (4)
as the set of proposals addressing a proto-coalition including i. For example, τi(h)(r,c)
is the probability that i accepts entering multilateral negotiations after history h un-
der the proposal (r,c). I will characterize the set of (pure) equilibria that are semi-
stationary in the following sense.
Definition 2.1 (Semi-stationarity). Let p(h) denote the sequence of proposals (rt ,ct)t≥0
implied by the history of play h ∈ H and define P = ∪h∈Hp(h). Semi-stationary per-
fect equilibria τ are perfect equilibria (Selten, 1975) that are measurable with respect
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to set of proposal sequences P, i.e. for all histories h,h′ ∈ H,
p(h) = p(h′) ⇒ τ(h) = τ(h′). (5)
That is, the strategies may depend on the proposal sequence F made before (e.g.
on which “concessions” F made), but they are independent of which player happened
to reject a proposal made in the past. This notion of “semi-stationarity” is not to
be confused with the (context dependent) alternative definitions of semi-stationarity
provided by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), Wooders (1998), and Kultti (2000). I
relax the standard assumption of stationarity, as strict stationarity would imply that
players ignore which proposals/concessions had been made before, which seems un-
realistic in the context of government coalition. Fully unrestricted non-stationarity,
in turn, does not allow me to express the intuitive notion of sincere voting (which is
implied in semi-stationary perfect equilibria). Without semi-stationarity, one’s payoff
maximizing voting decision would depend on who (if any) is anticipated to reject the
standing proposal, and this would not be “sincere.”
3 Analysis of the base model
In a first step of the analysis, I characterize the outcomes that may be sustained in
stationary equilibria. Under stationarity, F proposes the same pre-conditions r to the
same proto-coalition c in every round. In equilibrium, (r,c) is accepted without delay
and no player is better off deviating unilaterally. On the one hand this implies that pre-
conditions are accepted only if no player benefits from delaying agreement. Hence, r
must dominate the status quo for all i ∈ c, i.e. r ∈ R ∗ as defined next.
R ∗ = {r ∈ R | ∃c ∈C(r) : r %c v˜i} (6)
On the other hand, if all players anticipate that some r ∈ R is going to be proposed in
all future rounds round, and if there exists some (r′,c′) that all i ∈ c′ prefer to r, then
F is better off deviating to propose (r′,c′) in any round. For, all i ∈ c′ will accept it
when evaluating it in relation to their continuation payoffs vi(r). To summarize, the
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set of stationary equilibrium outcomes is the quasi core of Γ as defined next.3
QC(Γ) =
{
r ∈ R ∗ | @(r′,c′) ∈ PF such that r′ c′ r
}
(7)
It is called “quasi core,” because being “undominated in R ”4 is not sufficient for the
(quasi-) core property; in addition, the respective options have to dominate the status
quo. It coincides with the core of the formateur bargaining game if the status quo is
“bad,” and in this case, QC(Γ) is guaranteed to be non-empty.
Next, we characterize the outcome set under semi-stationarity. It contains all
outcomes compatible with stationarity, and additionally allows for two effects. On
the one hand, if a decisive coalition c′ prefers negotiating under r′ to some alternative
(r,c), then c′ accepts r′ if F “threatens” to go for (r,c) otherwise. Such threats can be
reiterated as long as ck prefers rk over (rk−1,ck−1) for all k ≥ 1, as in
rk ck rk−1 ck−1 · · · c2 r1 c1 r0, (8)
Any rk that is sustained by such a sequence can result in equilibrium if the seed (r0,c0)
is an equilibrium outcome. If (r0,c0) is to be sustained in a stationary continuation
equilibrium, however, then it is an element of the quasi core, and its very definition
thus rules out that it could be the seed of any such sequence. It follows that the con-
tinuation equilibrium inducing (r0,c0) cannot be stationary. A second issue with the
credibility of iterating threats as in (8) is that F must not be able to deviate profitably
to a proposal other than the one listed next in the sequence.
To illustrate how these issues can be resolved, let me first illustrate how ele-
ments of R ∗ that F prefers to some element of the quasi core can result under semi-
stationarity without iterating threats. Define
QC(Γ) :=
{
r ∈ R ∗ | ∃r′ ∈ QC(Γ) : r %F r′
}
, (9)
pick any r ∈ QC(Γ) \QC(Γ), and choose r′ ∈ QC(Γ) such that r %F r′. These addi-
tional elements r ∈QC(Γ)\QC(Γ) are potential seeds of iterated threats as in (8). An
equilibrium resulting in r along the path is: (i) F proposes r if he has never deviated
3This definition the quasi core should not be confused with alternative ones, as in Shapley and
Shubik (1966) and Shimomura (1997).
4r dominates r′ if r c r′ for some c ∈C(r) and r is undominated in R if no r′ ∈ R dominates r
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from proposing r in the past, (ii) F proposes r′ otherwise, and (iii) all players vote
sincerely. Hence, if F ever deviates from proposing r, then the continuation outcome
becomes r′, and since r′ is undominated in R , no pre-conditions but r′ would be ac-
cepted when r′ is the continuation outcome. Thus, when F deviates from c, then r′
results indeed, and since r %F r′, F is indeed best off proposing r initially. In this
way, r results in equilibrium although r is not undominated in R . The following
shows how this generalizes to sequences of iterated threats as in (8).
Lemma 3.1. Generically, there exists δ ∈ (0,1) such that r ∈ R can result in a semi-
stationary perfect equilibrium for all δ ∈ (δ,1) if there exists (rk,ck)k≤K for some
K ∈ N0 such that r = rK and
rK cK−F r
K−1 cK−1−F · · · c2−F r
1 c1−F r
k′ for some k′ ≤ K, (10)
and there exists r∗ ∈ QC(Γ) such that rk %F r∗ for all k ≤ K.
Proof. First, I show that r∗ ∈ QC(Γ) can result in a (stationary) perfect equilibrium.
Define the strategy profile τ where (i) F invariantly proposes r∗ and (ii) all opponents
vote sincerely. Formally, for all h ∈ H,
τF(h) = (r∗,c∗), (11)
∀i ∈ N ∀(r,c) ∈ Pi : τi
(
h,(r,c)
)
=
{
1, if r %i r∗,
0, otherwise.
(12)
By construction, it is a stationary strategy profile that results in r∗ along the path
of play. The voting decisions τi
(
h,(r,c)
)
are compatible with perfection, as vi(r∗)
is i’s continuation payoff in case (r,c) is rejected. To see that F’s proposals τF(h)
are compatible with perfection, too, note first that r∗ ∈ QC(Γ) implies @r′ ∈ R such
that a decisive coalition prefers r′ to r∗. Hence, and given the voting decisions of
the i ∈ N, F is strictly best off proposing r∗. Any r′ F r∗ that F prefers will be
accepted only with infinitesimal probability, and hence proposing any r′ F r∗ is not
optimal if δ < 1. Proposing options r′ with r∗ F r′ cannot be optimal regardless of
their acceptance probabilities, and for appropriately constructed tremble probabilities,
proposing (r∗,c∗) is strictly more profitable than proposing any (r′,c′) where r′∼F r∗.
Combined, this implies that τ is a perfect equilibrium.
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Second, consider r as claimed, define (rk,ck)k≤K for K ∈ N0 and r∗ ∈ QC(Γ)
such that rk %F r∗ for all k ≤ K. Consider the following strategy profile.
1. F proposes the options in the order
(
rK,cK
)
, . . . ,
(
r1,c1
)
,
(
rk
′
,ck
′)
,
(
rk
′−1,ck′−1
)
, . . .
until one is accepted. If F ever deviates from this sequence, then the continua-
tion strategies are the stationary equilibrium sustaining r∗ (see above).
2. F’s opponents vote sincerely (anticipating proposals as defined in point 1).
By construction, this strategy profile is semi-stationary, and the argument establishing
perfection is similar to the one above. Sincere voting implies that any proposal (rk,ck)
along this sequence would be accepted by the respective proto-coalition. This in
turn implies that any proposal deviating from this sequence would be rejected by at
least one player of any proto-coalition (since the next proposal would be r∗ which
is undominated in R ). Given this, F is best off sticking to the outlined proposal
sequence until a proposal is accepted.
Lemma 3.1 implies that a sequence need not be seeded in some r0 ∈ QC for
being sustainable in equilibrium. Alternatively, the sequence may be circular. The
following result completes the characterization of equilibrium outcomes under semi-
stationarity. It shows that it is not necessary that the “fall-back result” r∗ is in QC(Γ),
i.e. it is not necessary that F’s opponents prefer it to the status quo. The solution
set will be defined using a notion of self-generation as it is known from dynamic
programming.
Definition 3.2 (Self-generation). r ∈ R is enforceable on R′ ⊆R if rc−F r′ for some
c ∈C(r) and some r′ ∈ R′. The set R′ ⊆ R is self-generating in Γ if
1. for all r ∈ R′: r dominates the status quo v˜ or r is enforceable on R′, and
2. minR′ is undominated in R and minR′ F v˜
using minR′ := argminr′∈R′ vF(r′). The largest self-generating set is denoted as SG(Γ).
As the most important special case, consider the standard assumption that the
status quo is bad, i.e. vi(r) > v˜i for all i ∈ c ∈C(r) and all r. Then, the largest self-
generating set simply convexifies the core under %F , i.e. in this case, it simplifies
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to
Bad status quo: SG(Γ) = {r ∈ R | ∃r′,r′′ ∈ QC(Γ) such that r′ %F r %F r′′
}
.
This will be illustrated and further discussed in Section 5 (e.g. Lemma 5.2). The next
result establishes SG(Γ) as the solution set in general.
Proposition 3.3. Generically, there exists δ ∈ (0,1) such that r can result in a semi-
stationary perfect equilibrium for all δ ∈ (δ,1) if and only if r ∈ SG(Γ).
Proof. The proof of Lemma 3.1 is adapted straightforwardly to show that r∗ ∈ SG(Γ)
is sufficient. To establish this point, consider the following strategy profile.
1. F proposes (rk,ck) in order until one is accepted; if F ever deviates, then the
continuation equilibrium sustaining rmin = minSG(Γ) is adopted
2. F’s opponents vote sincerely in all cases
As above, sincere voting implies that the players accept any proposal along the se-
quence (since every proposal dominates its respective successor), and they reject any
other proposal (since rmin is the continuation outcome, which is undominated in R ).
Anticipating this, F is best off sticking to the proposal sequence.
It remains to show that r∗ ∈ SG(Γ) is necessary. For contradiction, assume a
semi-stationary perfect equilibrium τ exists that results in some r∗ /∈ SG(Γ). Define
R′ ⊆ R as the set of options that are accepted by some proto-coalition after some
history of play under τ. I show that R′ must be self-generating in the sense of Def.
3.2, which yields the contradiction.
First, assume that minR′ is not undominated in R , and consider any subgame
where r′ := minR′ is supposed to result. Assume that F deviates (in this subgame)
from proposing r′ toward proposing any r′′ that dominates r′. In case r′′ is accepted ac-
cording to τ, then F benefits from this unilateral deviation. In case r′′ is not accepted
according to τ, then either r′ is the continuation outcome or some r′′′ F r′ (since
r′ = minR′ and the valuations are generic). The former case contradicts perfection in
that the proto-coalition does not vote sincerely, and the latter implies that F benefits
by deviating toward r′′ in the considered subgame. Second, assume minR′ 6%F v˜. In
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this case, F is best off deviating from τ in subgames where F is supposed to propose
minR′ (anything worse than minR′, in F’s eyes, cannot result from this deviation, and
minR′ itself would be delayed, to the benefit of F). Third, assume that some r′ ∈ R′
neither dominates the status quo v˜ nor is enforcable on R′. Consider any subgame
where r′ results according to τ, i.e. is both proposed by F and accepted by the re-
spective proto-coalition, and let r′′ denote the continuation outcome if it would be
rejected by the proto-coalition (under semi-stationarity, r′′ is independent of the indi-
vidual voting decisions). If r′ = r′′, then r′ is accepted in a perfect equilibrium only if
it dominates the status quo. Since r′ does not dominate the status quo by assumption,
r′ 6= r′′ must apply. Such r′ is accepted by a proto-coalition (in a perfect equilibrium,
for δ≈ 1) only if r′ dominates r′′, i.e. if it is enforcable on R′ (the contradiction).
4 Players can publicly pre-commit
Next, we analyze the extension of the above game where F’s opponents may an-
nounce either negative or positive pre-commitments prior to F’s proposal. A negative
pre-commitment is one where i commits to reject negotiating under the respective
pre-conditions, and a positive pre-commitment is one where i commits to accept ne-
gotiating under these pre-conditions. The exact move structure is as follows.
Definition 4.1 (Extended move structure). The game proceeds in rounds as above. In
each round, first the non-formateur players announce pre-commitments with respect
to any r ∈ R , second F chooses (r,c), i.e. proposes coalition c to negotiate under
pre-conditions r, and third all i ∈ c vote on (r,c) to the degree they are uncommitted.
The proto-coalition is formed if all i ∈ c accept; otherwise a new round begins.
I assume that pre-commitments have to be renewed when a proposal of F had
been rejected, i.e. after each round. Any assumption of finite duration is outcome
equivalent to this one-round assumption. Alternatively, the game where pre-commit-
ments can be made once and for all, prior to the first round, is outcome equivalent to
a game with finite time horizon.
The additional notation can be kept brief. Primarily, D ⊆ {−1,0,1} denotes
the set of “directions” in which non-formateur players may pre-commit. By varying
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D, four kinds of games can be distinguished. If D = {−1,0,1}, then both positive
and negative pre-commitments are possible, if D = {0}, then pre-commitments are
impossible, if D = {0,1}, then only positive commitments are possible, and if D =
{−1,0}, then only negative commitments are possible. The game induced by D= {0}
has been analyzed above. The present section considers the remaining three games.
Strategy profiles are now pairs (κ,τ) with τi as defined above and κi(h,r) ∈D as
the pre-commitment of i ∈ N chosen after history h with respect to pre-condition r ∈
R . For example, κi(h,r) = 1 implies that i pre-commits to accept r when it should be
proposed by F . I consider perfect equilibria (κ,τ) in semi-stationary strategies.5 The
next result shows that in case positive pre-commitments are impossible, the possibility
of negative pre-commitments is outcome irrelevant.
Proposition 4.2. Assume positive pre-commitments are not possible, i.e. 1 /∈D. Gener-
ically, there exists δ ∈ (0,1) such that for all δ ∈ (δ,1), r can result in equilibrium iff
r ∈ SG(Γ).
Proof. First, I show that any r∗ ∈ SG(Γ) may result in equilibrium. Fix r∗ ∈ SG(Γ),
c∗ ∈C(r∗), and define a strategy profile sustaining (r∗,c∗) as well as rmin =minSG(Γ)
as in the proof of Prop. 3.3. That is, F’s opponents do not pre-commit along the path
of play, they vote sincerely in all cases, and F picks proposals from a sequence as
above. Given Lemma 3.1, it remains to show that F’s opponents cannot benefit by
making (negative) pre-commitments. Consider an arbitrary subgame; let (r,c) denote
its equilibrium outcome, and let (r′,c′) denote the respective continuation outcome. If
any of the players i ∈ c−F pre-commits to reject (r,c), then F is best off following the
proposal sequence nonetheless (since r′ %F rmin); hence negative pre-commitments
are optimal under the constructed strategy profile only for players who would reject
the respective proposal. Since the latter is ruled out by construction of the proposal
sequence, no player can gain by deviating unilaterally to a negative pre-commitment.
Second, I show that only r∗ ∈ SG(Γ) may result in equilibrium. Assume the
opposite and let R′ ⊆ R denote the set of (continuation) outcomes of an equilibrium
5To clarify, players with pre-commitments to accept or reject specific proposals can tremble just as
players with corresponding pure strategies can. Otherwise, perfection does not induce sincere voting
of the uncommitted players.
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τ contradicting this claim. The arguments showing that minR′ need be undominated
in R and that minR′ F v˜ follows equal those from Proposition 3.3. It remains to
be contradicted that ∃r ∈ R′ that neither dominates the status quo v˜ nor is enforcable
on R′. Let c denote the proto-coalition accepting r in the respective subgame, and
let (r′,c′) denote the continuation result in case F proposes (r,c) but gets rejected. If
r 6= r′, then r c−F r′ would have to apply (since r would not be accepted otherwise),
and since r′ ∈ R′ by definition of R′, r would then be enforcable on R′. Hence, r = r′
must hold true. Now, either (i) r 6i v˜ for some i∈ c−F , or (ii) r 6F v˜ must be satisfied.
In case (i), the respective i∈ c−F would gain by deviating unilaterally toward rejection
of (r,c), which contradicts the assumption that r may result in equilibrium, and in case
(ii), a contradiction to minR′ F v˜ results.
The result that the possibility of negative pre-commitments is outcome irrele-
vant may be surprising. The following explains the intuition. Announcing “knockout
criteria” (i.e. negative pre-commitments) allows non-formateur players to prevent F
from stating exorbitant pre-conditions. Now assume that a player pre-commits to re-
ject the first element (r′,c′) from a sequence of (iteratively self-enforcing) proposals.
As a result, F will have to settle with the next-best option, say (r,c). By assumption,
all i ∈ c′ prefer (r′,c′) over (r,c). Hence, pre-committing negatively with respect to
r′ indeed would prevent it, but it does so only in circumstances where i would actu-
ally want F to ask for r′. Players do therefore not benefit from announcing knockout
criteria in equilibrium, and the possibility do so is outcome irrelevant.
In contrast, consider the implications of positive pre-commitments. Their possi-
bility induces competition reminiscent of auctions between the non-formateur play-
ers, and in a first induction step F seems to benefit from it. Assume for example that
the equilibrium induces some (r,c) along the path of play, and that an option (r′,c′)
exists that all members of the proto-coalition c′ (including F) prefer to (r,c). If they
pre-commit to accept r′, then F will propose (r′,c′) instead of (r,c), and all of them
are better off. Hence, no such (r,c) may result along the equilibrium path. However,
this applies both in the beginning of the game, and more critically in any continuation
equilibrium after any history h. As a result, the “sustaining” threats required to build
complex self-generating sets are not credible anymore—i.e. the (r,c) thanks to which
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c′ accepts (r′,c′)—and for this reason, only singleton self-generating sets can now be
sustained in equilibrium. This leads us back to the quasi core, and in turn, F cannot
play the proto-coalitions off against one another if they can pre-commit positively.
Proposition 4.3. Assume positive pre-commitments are possible, i.e. 1 ∈ D. Generi-
cally, there exists δ ∈ (0,1) such that for all δ ∈ (δ,1), r can result in equilibrium iff
r ∈ QC(Γ).
Proof. First again, I show that any r∗ ∈ QC(Γ) may result in equilibrium. Fix r∗ and
c∗ ∈C(r∗), and let (κ,τ) denote a strategy profile as follows: (i) no pre-commitments
are made, (ii) F makes the payoff maximizing proposal given the actual pre-commit-
ments and anticipating (r∗,c∗) as the continuation outcome, and (iii) all i ∈ N vote
sincerely subject to standing pre-commitments. This strategy profile is stationary,
hence also semi-stationary, and results in (r∗,c∗) along the path of play. Mutual
optimality of both voting and proposal functions follows from their definitions. It
has to be shown that the players are best off not to pre-commit after any history of
play. F makes a proposal other than (r∗,c∗) iff an (r,c) exists such that r F r∗, and
kir = 1 or r i r∗ for all i ∈ c. It follows that only positive pre-commitments may
be payoff relevant for any i ∈ N, and they are payoff relevant only if they concern
r ∈ R : r F r∗ and r 6i r∗. Since the continuation payoff is (r∗,c∗) in all cases,
such pre-commitments are at least weakly dominated in all subgames, and they are
generally strictly dominated under full support. Hence, F’s opponents are never best
off deviating from the above strategy profile τ by making positive or negative pre-
commitments.
Second, I show that only r∗ ∈ QC(Γ) may result in equilibrium. Assume the
opposite, i.e. some r /∈ QC(Γ) may result in an equilibrium τ. Case 1: r is not un-
dominated in R . Hence, there exists (r′,c′) such that r′ c′ r. If all i ∈ c′−F would
pre-commit to accept r′, then F will be best off deviating to propose (r′,c′) in the cor-
responding subgame. For, since F cannot deviate profitably from proposing r along
the equilibrium path (recall that τ is a semi-stationary equilibrium), F must be best
off proposing r′ F r in the subgame where r′ will be accepted almost surely due to
pre-commitments. In turn, as each i ∈ c′−F prefer r′ over r, each of them is thus best
off pre-committing to accept r′ under full support—contradicting the assumption that
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τ was an equilibrium.
Case 2: r is undominated in R . Hence, r /∈ QC(Γ) implies that r 6c v˜. Let
c∈C(r) denote the proto-coalition that accepts r according to τ, and let (r′,c′) denote
the continuation result in case F proposes (r,c) and it gets rejected. Since (r,c) is
not rejected, either r = r′ or r c−F r′ is satisfied generically. If r = r′, then the
fact that r 6c v˜ contradicts the assumption that it is accepted in equilibrium. On the
one hand, if there exists i ∈ c−F such that r 6i v˜, then this i is better off rejecting
(r,c). On the other hand, if r 6F v˜, then F is best off deviating from proposing r
(let r′′ denote the continuation outcome; if r = r′′, then F benefits since r has been
delayed, else r F r′′ must result, since τ would not be an equilibrium otherwise, and
by transitivity r′′ 6F v˜; applied iteratively this contradicts either the finiteness of R
or the fact that F is best off proposing the respective option). Alternatively, if r 6= r′,
then rc−F r′ (as r would not be accepted otherwise), and in this case, the assumption
that (r′,c′) would be the continuation outcome contradicts the arguments made above
(note that r′ is not dominated in R ).
5 Application to standard examples
Existing applications of proto-coalition bargaining assume the one-round model, where
rational F generally choose the option (i.e. the coalition) they prefer most. Deviations
from this choice are explained through bounded rationality (i.e. random utility pertur-
bations). One application of the above model of strategic interaction between F and
his opponents is that it rationalizes certain deviations from the option F prefers most.
A second application that seems important can be explained best if we recall
that subsequent to the formation of the proto-coalition, intra-coalitional negotiations
start to allocate cabinet posts (and the like). Most existing studies assume that the
proto-coalition chosen by F bargains over the allocation of a cake using a random
proposer protocol (an exception is Baron and Diermeier, 2001). A general feature
of random proposer models is that a player’s expected utility is (weakly) increasing
in his recognition probability (i.e. in the probability that he is selected to make the
next proposal, see e.g. Eraslan, 2002). Hence, the allocation of proposal power likely
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becomes a topic during coalition formation. This is neglected in the existing applica-
tions of proto-coalition bargaining. For example, Diermeier et al. (2003) assume that
the recognition probabilities are exogenous and satisfy (slightly adapting notation and
neglecting cases where single parties have absolute majority)
ρi =
exp(aiλpii)
∑ j∈c exp(a jλpi j)
where λ ∈ R+ and ai ∈ R+∀i ∈ c, (13)
if c is the proto-coalition selected by F and pii is the seat share of i ∈ c in the parlia-
ment. Diermeier et al. assume ai = 1 for all i, i.e. symmetry after controlling for seat
shares, but this symmetry assumption is likely violated in certain cases. For exam-
ple, consider the case that i is more important for a successful coalition than j (e.g.
because i is ideologically central while j is one of several extreme options). Then
ai > a j intuitively follows. Naturally, empirical analyses of this hypothesis do not
yet exist, but the following theoretical results provide the basis for such an analysis.
First, let us define a class of proto-coalition games that endogenize the weights ai
underlying the recognition probabilities in Eq. (13).
Definition 5.1 (Distributive game). Let A = {a ∈ NN0 |∑i∈N ai = k}, for some k ≥ n,
denote the set of allocations and let C ⊂ P (N) denote the set of decisive coalitions.
The set of feasible proposals is
F = {(a,c) ∈ A×C | ∀i ∈ c : ai > 0 and ∀ j /∈ c : a j = 0}. (14)
For the following analysis, I assume the payoff functions vi satisfy the following
restrictions for all i. (A1) “more is better” in every coalition, (A2) separability of dis-
tributive preferences and coalition preferences, (A3) the status quo is bad but better
than nothing, and (A4) players prefer small coalitions. In relation to the existing liter-
ature, assumptions (A1) and (A4) are implied by typical models of random proposer
bargaining, (A3) is standard, and (A2) is satisfied for example under linear separabil-
ity as assumed by Diermeier et al. (2003). The term ∆i(c,c′) that is implicitly defined
in (A2) represents the compensation i requires when changing from c′ to c.
(A1) ai > a′i⇒ vi(a,c)> vi(a′,c)
(A2) For all c,c′ such that c∩ c′ ⊇ {i} there exists ∆i(c,c′) ∈ Z such that ∀a,a′ ∈ A:
ai−a′i > ∆i(c,c′)⇔ vi(a,c)> vi(a′,c′)
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(A3) ai > 0⇒ vi(a,c)> v˜i and ai = 0⇒ vi(a,c)< v˜i
(A4) i ∈ c⊂ c′⇒ ∆i(c,c′)< 0
The first result characterizes the relevant solution sets QC and SG and shows that
QC actually equates with the core.
Lemma 5.2. In distributive games, the quasi-core equates with the core,
QC(Γ) = {(a,c) ∈ F | @(a′,c′) ∈ F such that (a′,c′)c′ (a,c)}, (15)
and in addition, SG = QC and SG convexifies the core under %F ,
SG(Γ) = {(a,c) ∈ F | ∃(a′,c′) ∈ QC(Γ) such that (a,c)%F (a′,c′)}. (16)
Proof. By (A3), all feasible proposals (a,c) ∈ F dominate the status quo, and hence
the definition of QC simplifies to (15). (A3) also implies that all proposals in F \QC
dominate the status quo, and hence QC contains all (a,c) that F weakly prefers to
minQC. Finally, by definition of SG, (A3) implies that minSG (under %F ) equates
with minQC (under %F ). This yields the characterization of SG.
These characterizations of the solution sets will be helpful in the subsequent
analysis. The purpose is to show that the solution sets intuitively change as we vary
the circumstances of the coalition formation problem. In order to characterize the
circumstances, let us next formalize three kinds of restrictions that may be imposed
on distributive games. First, the game is simple (i.e. a simple majority game) if (i)
the complement to any minimal winning coalition (plus F) is also a winning coalition
and (ii) all minimal coalitions are of the same size. In the following, Cmin⊂C denotes
the set of minimal winning coalitions and |c| denotes the cardinality of c ∈C.
Definition 5.3 (Simple). (i) For all c ∈Cmin there exists a unique c′ ∈Cmin such that
c∩ c′ = {F}. (ii) For all c,c′ ∈Cmin, |c|= |c′|.
Second, the game is pure (i.e. purely distributive) if increases of the own weight
ai lexicographically dominate both one’s coalition preferences and one’s distributive
preferences concerning the allocation a−i between one’s opponents. Implicitly, this
requires that the compensations defined in (A2) satisfy ∆i(c,c′)∈ {0,−1} for all c,c′.
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Definition 5.4 (Pure). For all i ∈ N, all c,c′ ∈ C, and all a,a′ ∈ A: ai > a′i implies
vi(a,c)> vi(a′,c′).
Third, the game is homogenous if the players’ coalition preferences are aligned
in the sense that if one player prefers coalition c to coalition c′ (assuming he belongs
to both of them), then any other player in both of these coalitions prefers c, too.
Definition 5.5 (Homogenous). For all a∈A, all i, j∈N and c,c′ ∈C such that {i, j}⊆
c∩ c′: ∆i(c,c′)< 0⇒ ∆ j(c,c′)< 0.
First, let us look at cases where all three assumptions are satisfied. Then, the
outcome most preferred by F uniquely results. In these cases, the solution sets of the
infinite horizon games therefore equate with the one of the one-round proto-coalition
game that is used in the existing literature.
Lemma 5.6. If Γ is simple, pure, and homogenous, then SG(Γ) = {(a∗,c∗)} is a
singleton where c∗ ∈ argmaxc∈C vF(a∗,c) and a∗i = 1 for all i ∈ c∗ \{F}.
Proof. The proposal (a∗,c∗) defined above is the unique maximizer of vF , and hence
necessarily in QC (thus also in SG) if the status quo is bad. It has to be shown that it
is unique in QC; by the definition of SG, minQC = minSG under (A3), which then
extends the singleton property to SG. For contradiction, assume QC contains some
(a,c) 6= (a∗,c∗). Case 1: c 6= c∗. By feasibility of (a,c) and |c| ≥ |c∗|, an alternative
(a′,c∗) ∈ F exists such that a′i ≥ ai for all i ∈ c∗, and by preference homogeneity, all
i ∈ c∗ prefer it to (a,c). Case 2: a 6= a∗. If c 6= c∗ applies as well, then case 1 applies.
Otherwise, c = c∗ ∈Cmin applies, i.e. there is c′ ∈Cmin such that c∩c′ = {F}. Hence
(a′,c′) ∈ F exists such that a′i = 1 for all i ∈ c′ \{F}, and since a 6= a∗ implies either
ai > 1 for some i ∈ c\{F} or a j > 0 for some j /∈ c, this additionally allows a′F > aF .
Hence, all i ∈ c′ prefer (a′,c′) over (a,c), the contradiction.
Now, let us drop “homogeneity” of coalition preferences. In this case, F’s po-
tential coalition members may prefer other coalitions than F (e.g. because of their
relative ideological positioning). As we will see, this is sufficient to rationalize the
phenomenon that F cannot always install his most preferred coalition. Lemma 5.7
first establishes a necessary condition for inclusion in QC and SG, namely that every
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solution must sustain a minimal winning coalition and minimal weights for F’s op-
ponents, and second it shows by example that all but one minimal winning coalition
may be included in SG. In contrast, recall that if all players’ coalition preferences are
aligned (“homogenous”) then only F’s favorite coalition is included in SG.
Lemma 5.7. Assume Γ is simple and pure. (i) All (a∗,c∗) ∈ SG satisfy c∗ ∈Cmin and
a∗i = 1 for all i ∈ c∗ \ {F}. (ii) There are constellations of preferences where all but
one c ∈Cmin are sustained in SG.
Proof. Point (i): First, we show c∗ ∈ Cmin for all (a∗,c∗) ∈ QC. For contradiction,
assume there exists (a′,c′) ∈ QC such that c′ /∈ Cmin. Thus, there is c ∈ Cmin such
that c ⊂ c′, and by (A4) this implies ∆i(c,c′) < 0 for all i ∈ c. Define a such that
(a,c) ∈ F and ai = a′i for all i ∈ c \ {F}. By ∆i(c,c′) < 0, vi(a,c) > vi(a′,c′) for
all i ∈ c results, the contradiction. Knowing c∗ ∈Cmin for all (a∗,c∗) ∈ QC, we next
show a∗i = 1 for all i∈ c\{F}. Assume there exists (a′,c)∈QC such that c∈Cmin but
ai > 1 for some i 6= F . By simplicity, there exists c′′ ∈Cmin such that c′′∩ c′ = {F},
and hence there also exists (a′′,c′′) ∈ F such that a′′i = 1 (implying a′′i > a′i) for all
i ∈ c′′ \{F}. Now, |c′′|= |c′| implies a′′F > a′F , and hence vi(a′′,c′′)> vi(a′,c′) for all
i ∈ c′′ follows (the contradiction). Thus the result is established for all (a∗,c∗) ∈ QC,
and since |c| = |c′| for all c,c′ ∈Cmin under simplicity, this implies a∗F = k−|c∗| for
all (a∗,c∗)∈QC. Hence, a∗F > aF for all (a,c)∈F where c /∈Cmin, and by purity, this
implies vF(a∗,c∗) > vF(a,c). Due to minQC = minSG under %F , this extends the
claim to all (a∗,c∗)∈ SG. Point (ii): Let aF,max denote the maximal bargaining weight
ai that F can attain subject to feasibility (a,c)∈F , and define the worst-case coalition
c ∈ argminc′∈Cmin vF(a,c′) subject to aF = aF,max. Let c denote the complement to c,
i.e. the unique c ∈Cmin such that c∩c = {F}. Construct preferences such that c is the
second-worst coalition in F’s eyes, i.e. ∆F(c,c′) = 0 for all c′ 6= c, and such that all
i 6= F have coalition preferences that oppose those of F , i.e. for all c,c′ ∈Cmin such
that c∩ c′ 3 i: ∆i(c,c′) =−1−∆F(c,c′). Due to ∆F(c,c) =−1, i.e. F prefers c to its
(unique) complement, there must be some a such that (a,c) ∈ QC (by construction,
for alternative c′, there is at least one i 6= F that prefers c to c′). By convexity of SG
under %F and the fact that c is the second-worst coalition in F’s eyes, this implies
that all c′ ∈Cmin but c are sustained in SG.
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An alternative explanation for the possibility that F is unable to install his favored
coalition is that the majority game is not simple, i.e. that the complement to a decisive
coalition plus F is not decisive. To illustrate this, let us look at the case that the
formateur has no voting power himself. If the majority game is simple otherwise,
this implies that the intersection of all pairs of minimal winning coalitions has two
elements, F and one other player. The next result shows that in such cases, QC
sustains only F’s favorite coalition, while SG sustains all minimal winning coalitions.
Thus, if F’s opponents cannot make positive pre-commitments, any minimal winning
coalition may result in equilibrium.
Lemma 5.8. Assume Γ is pure, homogenous, and satisfies |c| = |c′| as well as |c∩
c′|= 2 for all c,c′ ∈Cmin. Then, the following applies.
1. (a∗,c∗) ∈ QC only if c∗ ∈ argmaxc∈C vF(a∗,c) and a∗i ∈ {1,2} for all i 6= F
2. There is at least one (a∗,c∗) ∈ QC where a∗i = 2 for some i 6= F
3. For all c ∈Cmin, there exists some a such that (a,c) ∈ SG
Proof. Point 1: c ∈Cmin follows from (A4). Given this, c = c∗ follows from homo-
geneity and |c| = |c∗| for all c ∈Cmin. For any alternative (a,c), there exists (a′,c∗)
that F prefers by definition of c∗ and that all i∈ c∗∩c prefer by homogeneity. Finally,
assume (for contradiction) that there exists (a∗,c∗) such that a∗i > 2 for some i 6= F .
Take any c ∈Cmin such that c∩c∗ 3 j 6= i and define a such that a j = a∗j +1 and ak =
for all k /∈ { j,F}. This implies aF > a∗F and hence vk(a,c)> vk(a∗,c∗) for all k ∈ c,
which contradicts (a∗,c∗) ∈ QC. Point 2: Define a∗ ∈ argmaxa vF(a,c∗) s.t. ai = 2
for at least one i 6= F . I claim (a∗,c∗) ∈ QC. Define i 6= F as the player with a∗i = 2.
By purity, i is unique. Hence, for all (a,c) such that vF(a,c)> vF(a∗,c∗), a j = 1 for
all j 6= F holds true. Also for all such (a,c), c∩ c∗ contains at least one j 6= F , and
by homogeneity and a j ≤ a∗j , v j(a,c) < v j(a∗,c∗). Hence, no such (a,c) dominates
(a∗,c∗). Point 3: Since (a∗,c∗) as constructed in point 2 is in QC, and since SG con-
vexifies QC under %F , all (a,c) satisfying c ∈ Cmin and ai = 1 for all i 6= F are in
SG.
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Finally, by relaxing “purity” we can investigate the case that F strongly favors
a specific coalition. Intuitively one may suspect that the members of F’s favorite
coalition are able to exploit F’s desire to coalesce with them and extract additional
bargaining power. Again, structural empirical analyses of this intuition do not yet ex-
ist, but as I show next, this intuition is indeed compatible with the solution sets derived
above. Formally, define the “relative (opportunity) costs” RC(c) = minc′ ∆F(c,c′) as
the compensation required by F for choosing c instead of the best alternative to c.
The unique minimizer of RC(c) is the coalition favored by F , i.e. it is
c∗ ∈ argmax
c∈C
max
a∈A
vF(a,c). (17)
The following lemma shows that F’s favored coalition c∗ necessarily results, while its
members can extract up to RC(c∗) units of bargaining weight from F during coalition
formation. The resulting allocation of this bargaining weight is not restricted in equi-
librium (i.e. any of c∗’s members may get it). For simplicity, the following assumes
that F prefers c∗ equally strongly over all alternatives to c∗ in terms of ∆F(c∗, ·).
Lemma 5.9. Assume Γ is simple, homogenous, and ∆F(c∗,c′) = ∆F(c∗,c′′) for all
c′,c′′ such that c′ 6= c∗, c′′ 6= c∗, and c∗ ∈ argminc RC(c). Then, both QC and SG are
the sets of all (a∗,c∗) ∈ F satisfying
c∗ ∈ argmax
c∈C
max
a∈A
vF(a,c) |c∗| ≤ ∑
i 6=F
a∗i < |c∗|−RC(c∗). (18)
Proof. All (a∗,c∗) satisfying the above constraints also satisfy vF(a∗,c∗) > vF(a,c)
for all (a,c) ∈ F where c 6= c∗ (by definition of RC). Hence, all such (a,c) /∈ QC in
general, and (a∗,c∗) /∈ QC only if there exists (a,c∗) ∈ F such that a weakly Pareto
dominates a∗. The latter applies only if ∑i∈c∗ ai > ∑i∈c∗ a∗i (over all i ∈ c∗), which
in turn violates feasibility. Hence, all these (a∗,c∗) are in QC and hence in SG. It
remains to show that no (a∗,c∗) is in QC that satisfies ∑i 6=F a∗i ≥ |c∗|−RC(c∗). All
such a∗ thus satisfy a∗F ≤ k−|c∗|+RC(c∗). Define c ∈C such that c∩ c∗ = {F}. By
assumption RC(c∗) = ∆F(c∗,c), and thus by (A2), vF(a′,c)> vF(a∗,c∗) if a∗i −a′i ≤
∆F(c∗,c), i.e. if aF = k−|c|+1. The latter applies if ai = 1 for all i ∈ c\{F}, and is
therefore feasible. Hence, no (a∗,c∗) is in QC where a∗F ≤ k−|c∗|+RC(c∗).
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6 Conclusion
The paper analyzed the formation of proto-coalitions without the assumption of a fi-
nite time horizon. The existing literature focuses on one-round models, which imply
that a rational F forms his favored proto-coalition if the payoffs under the caretaker
government are not prohibitive (and they often are not, since the caretaker has lim-
ited legitimacy). The one-round assumption prevents the possibility that F’s potential
coalition partners strategically interact with F , say to implement their favored coali-
tions or to extract bargaining power from F . I have characterized the solution sets of
the infinite horizon games (assuming semi-stationary strategies) for two alternative
regimes. If F’s opponents can publicly pre-commit, then the “quasi core” is imple-
mented, which in turn equates with the core if the status quo is “bad.” If F’s oppo-
nents cannot pre-commit, then the solution can be characterized as a self-generating
set, which exactly convexifies the core if the status quo is bad. In this sense, we can
conclude that proto-coalition bargaining implements or convexifies the core.
These characterizations of the solution sets are straightforwardly applicable in
empirical analyses if the valuations of all participants are well defined (as in Dier-
meier et al., 2002, 2003, for example). This seems promising, since the infinite hori-
zon game has been shown (in Section 5) to be compatible with the phenomena that
F’s favored coalition may not form and that F may have to give up bargaining power
toward “strong” coalition partners. In the existing literature, the former has not been
rationalized yet for non-prohibitive default payoffs, and the latter has not yet been
formalized explicitly. These extensions of the proto-coalition model should facilitate
future empirical work.
Finally, let me comment on the fact that the characterization of the equilibrium
outcomes yielded a solution set, but obviously not a probability distribution over the
solution set. There does not seem to be a generally accepted approach to the resolu-
tion of such a multiplicity of equilibria for empirical analyses. However, empirical
applications of the one-round game assumed logit choice of F , rather than rational
choice, to account for deviations from F’s favored choice. The same approach can
be applied in applications of the infinite horizon game if we substitute “logit equi-
librium” for logit choice (following McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, in general, and
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Breitmoser et al., 2010, for dynamic games)—and in the case of logit equilibria, the
standard approach is to focus on the equilibria located on the “the principal branch”
(Turocy, 2005, 2010). In this way, the multiplicity is resolved immediately, while the
interaction between F and the other parties can be modeled accurately.
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